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Amazon’s Prime Reliance on the
First Amendment’s Free
Expression Protections in Coral
Ridge Ministries Media, Inc., v.
Amazon.com, Inc.
Avery Hart Hayes*
I. INTRODUCTION
Is freedom of expression sometimes more important than one’s
reputation and religious inclusion? Spoiler alert—the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals says yes.
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.”1 Defamation law has existed for
centuries; however, it was not until the Civil Rights Movement of the
1960s that the Supreme Court of the United States considered
defamation law in conjunction with the First Amendment. Since then,
the protections of the First Amendment are especially heightened when
it comes to published criticism of public officials and public figures. The
rationale for this heightened standard is that statements about public
officials and public figures are matters of public concern and, as such,
should be widely available to the public.
As it relates to discrimination, the First Amendment protects
messages conveyed by private individuals or entities. Even when the
messages exclude groups on a discriminatory basis, such exclusionary
messages are protected by the First Amendment and are, therefore,
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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permitted. In other words, sometimes excluding a certain group is part
of conveying a message. In that case, excluding the group is not
discrimination, rather it is protected free expression.
In Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc.,2 the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of free
expression when a religious organization was denied the opportunity to
participate in Amazon.com, Inc.’s (Amazon) charitable giving program,
AmazonSmile.3 Through the AmazonSmile program, Amazon customers
may select Amazon-approved charities of their choice, and a portion of
the customers’ Amazon purchases will be donated to the selected
charities. The court clarified how the First Amendment works in
conjunction with defamation and discrimination claims, explaining that
the First Amendment not only protects spoken words but also
expressive conduct.4 Adhering to the authority of the First Amendment,
the court chose not to force Amazon to donate to an organization that it
did not support.5
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant AmazonSmile is a nonprofit foundation created by
Amazon that donates 0.5% of the revenue from purchases on
AmazonSmile’s website to eligible charity organizations.6 Customers
shopping on AmazonSmile may select eligible charities to which they
would like Amazon to donate a percentage of customers’ purchase
price.7 Eligible charities are selected by Amazon using the following
criteria: (1) the organizations “must be registered and in good standing
with the IRS as a 501(c)(3)” and meet other regulatory criteria; (2) the
organizations “must . . . adhere to the AmazonSmile Participation
Agreement;” and (3) the “organizations that engage in, support,
encourage, or promote intolerance, hate, terrorism, violence, money
laundering, or other illegal activities are not eligible to participate.”8 In
deciding which organizations to designate as “hate groups,”
AmazonSmile relies on the Southern Poverty Law Center’s (SPLC) Hate
Map and discloses on its website that it does so. SPLC’s Hate Map
defines hate groups as those with “‘beliefs or practices that attack or
2. 6 F.4th 1247 (11th Cir. 2021).
3. Id. at 1255.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, Coral Ridge Ministries
Media, Inc. v. Amazon.Com, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00566-MHT-DAB (M.D. Ala 2017).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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malign an entire class of people, typically for their immutable
characteristics’ whose ‘activities can include criminal acts, marches,
rallies, speeches, meetings, leafleting or publishing.’”9
Plaintiff Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. (Coral Ridge) is a
Florida-based evangelical Christian nonprofit media company that is
directed by a Florida megachurch and dedicated to sharing the late D.
James Kennedy’s view of the Christian Gospel.10 This view includes a
literal adherence to biblical passages including statements about
homosexuality.11 Coral Ridge relies on biblical passages in openly
opposing what it calls “the homosexual agenda.”12 The SPLC declared
Coral Ridge a hate group on its Hate Map because of Coral Ridge’s
religious beliefs and teaching regarding homosexuality.13 In January
2017, Coral Ridge applied for membership in the AmazonSmile
program, and AmazonSmile deemed Coral Ridge ineligible for the
program based on the SPLC’s designation of Coral Ridge as a hate
group on its Hate Map.14
Coral Ridge filed suit in the Middle District of Alabama claiming
defamation under Alabama law against the SPLC and discrimination
under Title II of the Civil Rights Act against Amazon.15 The defamation
claim was against SPLC for listing Coral Ridge on its Hate Map, and
the discrimination claim was against Amazon for allegedly
discriminating against Coral Ridge on the basis of religion. Both the
SPLC and Amazon moved to dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The trial court dismissed both claims. In its order
dismissing the claims, the trial court pointed to the First Amendment
in dismissing both the defamation claim and the discrimination claim.
However, the court’s primary reason for dismissing the discrimination
claim was that the AmazonSmile program was not covered by Title II of
the Civil Rights Act because Amazon is a private entity. Coral Ridge
appealed and the case reached the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.16

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Appellant Brief, Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. Amazon.Com, Inc., No. 1914-125 (C.A. 11 2020).
14. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, Coral Ridge Ministries
Media, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00566-MHT-DAB.
15. Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc., 6 F.4th at 1247.
16. Id. at 1250–51.
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The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the
complaint.17
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Defamation as it Relates to the First Amendment
To establish a defamation claim under Alabama law, a plaintiff must
show: “(1) that the defendant was at least negligent (2) in publishing (3)
a false and defamatory statement to another (4) concerning the
plaintiff, (5) which is either actionable without having to prove special
harm . . . or actionable upon allegations and proof of special harm.”18
However, when the state law is applied to public figures and public
officials, the First Amendment imposes additional requirements.19
These additional requirements include: (1) “the allegedly defamatory
statement must be ‘sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved
true or false,’ [(2)] the statement must actually be false, [and (3)] a
public-figure plaintiff must prove that the defendant made the alleged
defamatory statement with ‘actual malice.’”20
In the 1964 case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,21 the Supreme
Court of the United States determined for the first time how the First
Amendment’s free expression protections are to be applied in cases
where public figures sue their critics for defamation.22 There, the Court
established the “actual malice” requirement.23 This case was decided
during the Civil Rights Movement, and although defamation had been a
cause of action for many years, the Supreme Court had never applied
the First Amendment’s freedom of expression to allegedly defamatory
speech. It was not until the New York Times reported on the civil rights
protests and police interaction with protesters that the Court carved out
First Amendment protections for publishing these stories. In New York
Times, the Court discussed its previous decisions where it stated that
the Constitution does not protect libelous publications, but then made a

17. Id. at 1256.
18. Id. at 1251–52. (quoting Ex parte Bole, 103 So. 3d 40, 51 (Ala. 2012)).
19. Id. at 1252.
20. Id. (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990)).
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. Id. at 256.
23. The “actual malice” requirement has been a topic of debate over the past several
years. Critics believe it gives the press too much room for error in reporting about public
figures, and supporters believe the requirement does its intended job of keeping the public
informed on issues of public concern.
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distinction for cases that involve the critique of public officials.24 The
Court highly regarded the First Amendment’s protection of open
discussion of public issues, which “sometimes [includes] unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials.”25 Further, even
untrue statements about public officials are protected by the First
Amendment when the statements are not made knowingly or with
reckless disregard of the truth.26 The Court reasoned that erroneous
statements are inevitable in open debate.27 The Court set the precedent
that neither factual error nor defamatory speech (nor the combination
of both) automatically overrides the First Amendment’s free speech
protections for publications regarding public officials.28
Perhaps most notably, the New York Times Court held that public
officials may only recover damages under a defamation claim when
there is a showing of actual malice on the part of the defendant.29 The
Court defined actual malice as “know[ing] that [the statement] was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”30 The
actual malice standard is a high threshold, making it difficult for public
officials to recover damages in defamation suits.31
Three years after New York Times was decided, the Supreme Court
of the United States in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts32 extended First
Amendment protections of defamatory criticism about public officials in
the same way the First Amendment protects defamatory criticism about
public figures. In other words, instead of only applying to officials
employed by the government, the actual malice standard was extended
to everyone with public notoriety or fame.33
In 1968, the Supreme Court of the United States clarified what it
takes to meet the “actual malice” requirement in St. Amant v.
Thompson.34 Specifically, the Court addressed what constitutes
“reckless disregard of whether [the statement] was false or not.”35 In
24. Id. at 268.
25. Id. at 270.
26. Id. at 271.
27. Id. at 271–72.
28. Id. at 273.
29. Id. at 279–80.
30. Id. at 280.
31. The New York Times article at issue was about alleged widespread police
brutality against Civil Rights Movement protestors. It took an issue as monumental as
this for the Court to carve out a rule giving heightened protection to stories like this.
32. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
33. Id. at 134.
34. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
35. Id. at 728.
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this case the accusatory statements the defendant made about the
public official plaintiff during a televised speech did not meet the actual
malice requirement, and the Court stated that in order to act with
reckless disregard of the truth, one must have serious doubt about the
truthfulness of the statement.36
The Supreme Court of the United States expounded upon the
element of untruthfulness regarding allegedly defamatory statements
about public officials and public figures in Milkovich,37 decided in 1990.
The Court determined that when a statement of opinion about a public
official or public figure is not able to be proven false, it is protected by
the First Amendment.38 Further, the Court held that when a statement
of public concern is proven false, the public official or public figure
about which the statement was made must show that it was made with
actual malice.39 In reaching its decision that all opinion-based
statements about public officials are not protected by the First
Amendment (namely, those which are actually false and made with
reckless disregard of the truth), the Court struck a balance between the
First Amendment’s free speech protections and the protections of one’s
reputation afforded by defamation law.40
B. Pleading Standards for Defamation Claims
In 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
discussed pleading standards for defamation cases involving public
officials and public figures in Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc.41 There, the
court held that the plaintiff must “plead facts giving rise to a reasonable
inference that the defendants [made the statements] with actual
malice” to successfully state a claim for defamation.42 A failure to do so
results in dismissal of the claim without prejudice giving the
opportunity for the defendant to amend the complaint.43 For example,
the court held that the defendant pleading that the allegedly
defamatory statements were made with a “blatant reckless disregard
for the truth”44 did not adequately plead that the statements were
published with actual malice, because the defendant did not
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 731.
497 U.S. 1.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 22–23.
816 F.3d 686 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 692.
Id.
Id. at 693.
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“adequately plead that the statements were published with actual
malice.”45 The plaintiff must plead facts leading to a reasonable
inference that the defendants intentionally avoided learning the truth.46
In reaching its decision, the court clarified that failure to investigate
does not necessarily show the defendant intentionally avoided learning
the truth.47 The court determined that conclusory assertions of the
elements of defamation are not adequate for pleading defamation.48
Four years after the Michel case, the Eleventh Circuit expounded
upon the factual allegation standard for pleading in deciding Berisha v.
Lawson.49 The test for determining whether the defendant acted with
actual malice is subjective.50 Therefore, there is no clear test for what
constitutes actual malice. The subjectivity of actual malice makes it
hard to predict what evidence may lead the court to conclude that a
statement was made with actual malice.
C. Discrimination as it Relates to the First Amendment
Title II of the Civil Rights Act states in pertinent part, “‘[a]ll persons
shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation, as defined in this section, without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or
national origin.’”51 For purposes of analyzing Coral Ridge Ministries
Media, Inc., the relevant part of this statute falls within the meaning of
“services, [] privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation.”52 Just as with alleged defamation, the First
Amendment is also applied to alleged discrimination. It is wellestablished that the First Amendment not only protects spoken word
but also expressive conduct.
In the 1995 case Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston,53 the Supreme Court of United States held that
applying a state law prohibiting discrimination based upon sexual
orientation to private citizens organizing an event violated the First

45. Id. at 701–02.
46. Id. at 704.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 973 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2020).
50. Id. at 1312.
51. Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc., 6 F.4th at 1253 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)
(1964)).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a).
53. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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Amendment.54 There, the Court reasoned that the petitioners’ event
was a form of protected expression because they intended to make a
collective point, and symbolic acts are protected free speech under the
First Amendment.55 The Court’s decision turned on the First
Amendment notion that “a speaker has the autonomy to choose the
content of his own message.”56 In adhering to that principle, the Court
held that the event organizers’ ability to choose what message they
wished to convey is protected by the First Amendment, thus excluding
the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston from
the event.57 The Court also discussed the government’s interest in
protecting against harmful behavior such as discrimination.58 In that
regard, the Court expressed that the law “is not free to interfere with
speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may
strike the government.”59 Therefore, the holding in Hurley set the
precedent that First Amendment protections allow for private citizens
to promote a message even when that message is discriminatory.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated that expressive
conduct is free speech protected under the First Amendment in Fort
Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale,60 decided in
2018. There, providing food in a public park with the intention of
sharing the food with others was an act of political solidarity and was
determined to be expressive conduct.61 The court pointed to precedent
stating, “‘in determining whether conduct is expressive, we ask whether
the reasonable person would interpret it as some sort of message, not
whether an observer would necessarily infer a specific message.’”62 In
holding that the manner in which the organization served food was
expressive conduct, the court reasoned that context is important, as it
may give meaning to the conduct.63 There, the court pointed to multiple
contextual factors—such as signs, banners, and location of the event—
surrounding the serving of the food that would lead a reasonable person
to interpret the food sharing as conveying some sort of message, making
54. Id.
55. Id. at 568.
56. Id. at 573.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 579.
59. Id.
60. 901 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2018).
61. Id. at 1238.
62. Id. at 1240 (quoting Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270
(11th Cir. 2004)).
63. Id. at 1241.
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it expressive conduct.64 In sum, Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs
stands for the proposition that the nature of an activity may be
combined with the context of an activity to support a conclusion that
the activity is expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.65
Taken together, these cases posit that when conveying a certain
message, the First Amendment affords protection for a speaker to tailor
that message to get the point across, even when the message is
expressive conduct as opposed to spoken word.
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
In Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals was faced with a plaintiff claiming defamation and
discrimination and wishing to rid itself of its Hate Group designation
with hopes of receiving donations through the AmazonSmile program.66
Rather than buying into Coral Ridge’s defamation and discrimination
claims, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, with Judge Wilson
authoring the decision, upheld the trial court’s decision to dismiss the
case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.67 At
the heart of both claims was the First Amendment.
A. Coral Ridge’s Defamation Claim Against the Southern Poverty Law
Center
In reaching its decision, the court first analyzed Alabama’s
defamation law as applied to public figures.68 The court began with
pointing out the additional requirements the First Amendment imposes
when defamation law is applied to public figures including the “actual
malice” requirement which the New York Times case imposed and the
Berisha case expounded upon.69 The additional “actual malice”
requirement was the main requirement at issue in the case. In applying
the actual malice requirement, the court held that, since Coral Ridge’s
complaint stated allegations in a conclusory manner and did not allege
any facts that would back up that claim, the allegations of defamation
were insufficient to state a claim.70 As such, since Coral Ridge’s claim
for defamation did not meet the required pleading standard for actual

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 1241–42.
Id. at 1245.
6 F.4th at 1251.
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1251–53.
Id. at 1252.
Id.

736

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

malice, the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal. For Coral Ridge’s
claim to survive the motion to dismiss, the complaint would have had to
allege specific ways in which the SPLC published false information
about Coral Ridge knowingly or with reckless disregard of the truth.
Therefore, the court set aside Coral Ridge’s allegations that the court
regarded as purely conclusory—that is, the ones that simply allege the
SPLC acted “‘with actual malice’” in publishing its Hate Map.71
Next, the court turned to Coral Ridge’s allegation that the SPLC’s
definition of hate group is “so far removed from the commonly
understood meaning of the term that its designation of Coral Ridge as a
hate group is ‘intentionally false and deceptive.’”72 Pointing out that
this allegation was close to a mere recital of one of the elements of
defamation under Alabama law, the court noted that this allegation was
practically conclusory as well. The court reasoned that, regardless of
whether the SPLC’s definition of hate group is the commonly
understood definition or not, the definition is not misleading since it is
openly posted on the SPLC’s website. Moreover, Coral Ridge did not
allege any facts that would point to the SPLC having a subjectively
culpable state of mind. Therefore, Coral Ridge did not meet the actual
malice requirement. 73
Finally, the court addressed Coral Ridge’s allegation that the SPLC
acted with “‘reckless disregard [of] the truth’” in posting Coral Ridge on
its Hate Map.74 The court, again, maintained that Coral Ridge did not
allege any facts to support this allegation.75 The court reasoned that
Coral Ridge’s statement that it “‘has never attacked or maligned anyone
on the basis of engaging in homosexual conduct’” does not have any
bearing on whether the SPLC believed its designation of Coral Ridge as
a hate group was proper.76
B. Coral Ridge’s Discrimination Claim Against Amazon
The court then turned to Coral Ridge’s religious discrimination claim
against Amazon under Title II of the Civil Rights Act.77 Coral Ridge
asserted that customers, rather than Amazon, donate under the
AmazonSmile program. As such, it is the customer—not Amazon—

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1252–53.
Id. at 1253.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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participating in expressive conduct.78 In disagreeing with this assertion,
the court reasoned that the customers are able to select their eligible
charity of choice, but it is Amazon who is providing the funds for the
donation. The court’s analysis of the Title II discrimination claim is
rooted in the First Amendment. Specifically, the court agreed with the
trial court that forcing Amazon to donate to charities that it does not
support would violate the First Amendment. The court’s reasoning
included a discussion of expressive conduct, stating that if the conduct
in question is expressive conduct, it is protected by the First
Amendment. Further, it was undisputed that donating money is
considered expressive conduct. Looking to the Fort Lauderdale Food
Not Bombs case, the court reasoned that Amazon’s express statement in
the AmazonSmile criteria relies on the SPLC when determining which
organizations it wishes to support through the AmazonSmile program.
This would lead a reasonable person to believe that Amazon is
conveying “‘some sort of message’” through only supporting certain
organizations. Therefore, the court determined that Amazon’s choice of
which organizations to support is expressive conduct and protected
under the First Amendment.79
Next, the court analogized this case to the Hurley case.80 In doing so,
the court pointed out that the private citizens in Hurley engaged in
expressive conduct because they chose which groups they wanted to
participate in their event. The court reasoned that this was similar to
the way that Amazon engaged in expressive conduct when choosing not
to support Coral Ridge through the AmazonSmile program.81 Therefore,
the First Amendment protects Amazon’s expressive conduct in the same
way it protected the citizens’ expressive conduct in Hurley.82
Coral Ridge failed on both claims against both defendants. Since
Coral Ridge did not properly allege a claim for defamation against the
SPLC and its application of the discrimination claim against Amazon
violates the First Amendment, the court affirmed the trial court’s
decision to dismiss the case.83
V. IMPLICATIONS
The decision in Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. impacts entities
that donate profits to charities, charities or organizations wishing to
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1254.
Id. at 1254–55.
Id. at 1255.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1256.
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participate in giving programs like AmazonSmile, and individuals who
wish to donate to charities through programs like AmazonSmile. In
addition, this decision will likely force plaintiffs to write much more
detailed allegations for defamation claims in their complaints to avoid
being dismissed in the Eleventh Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit’s broad application of the First Amendment
could work against charities or organizations wishing to participate in
giving programs. In addition to AmazonSmile, giving programs can
include percentage nights at restaurants in which a portion of the
profits are donated to charities or organizations and gift matching
programs in which an entity agrees to match donations for a specified
period of time. In sum, giving programs could potentially include any
fundraising effort in which an entity donates profits to a charity or
organization. If the charity or organization stands for a cause that the
entity does not wish to support, according to the Coral Ridge Ministries
Media, Inc. court, the First Amendment allows the entity to deny
support to the organization and this denial is not considered
discrimination. As follows, organizations that stand for causes that may
be controversial—such as religion, LGBTQ+ rights, or other politically
charged causes—may face difficulties in gaining access to giving
programs as a result of the Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. decision.
There is a notable difference between private entities and public
entities regarding discrimination claims. Title II of the Civil Rights Act,
as Coral Ridge attempted to utilize it, does not apply to private entities.
However, it does apply to public entities. The Coral Ridge Ministries
Media, Inc. the court determined that Amazon is a private entity,
despite its global presence and seemingly limitless financial power and
influence. The discrimination portion of the Coral Ridge Ministries
Media, Inc. decision specifically deals with private entities, like
Amazon, and public figures, like Coral Ridge. Therefore, no matter how
“public” and influential a private entity may seem, choosing not to
donate to a charity on the basis of religious beliefs is not considered
discrimination, as Title II of the Civil Rights Act does not apply to
private entities. It is worth considering whether, in the future, stateless
global empires like Amazon in this technological revolution should be
treated like public entities and, therefore, be subject to public entity
rules.
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit’s broad application of the
First Amendment protects entities that are selective in the charities
they support.84 As previously mentioned, entities may deny support to
organizations on the basis that the organization stands for a cause in
84. Think: fast food chicken chain that is known for its Christian values.
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which the entity does not wish to donate money. The Coral Ridge
Ministries Media, Inc. decision makes clear that this kind of act is not
discrimination and is expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment. However, the Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. court
only addressed donating money raised from profits, so the decision
could be interpreted to cover donations of goods or services.
Regarding individual donors, some individuals may feel like Amazon
should not be allowed to limit their free expression as customers. In
other words, Amazon customers may feel as though it is not Amazon’s
place to decide which charities they can and cannot donate to through
AmazonSmile. However, as the court pointed out, it is Amazon’s
money—not the customers’—that is being donated. Therefore, Amazon’s
free expression is at issue, not the customers’. If customers wish to
donate to a charity that is not approved to participate in AmazonSmile,
they may do so outside of the AmazonSmile program. Therefore,
customers’ free expression is not at risk as it relates to Amazon’s ability
to choose which charities may participate in the AmazonSmile program.
When alleging claims of defamation, the Coral Ridge Ministries
Media, Inc. decision reiterates that there is a high pleading standard in
which a public figure plaintiff must allege specific facts—not conclusory
assertions—regarding the defendants’ actions and the actual malice
requirement. As a result of the high pleading standard, plaintiffs must
be diligent in claiming defamation in the Eleventh Circuit or else the
case is at risk of not surviving a motion to dismiss. Being diligent
means alleging concrete facts that point to the defendant knowingly or
recklessly disregarding the truth.
It is worth noting that in footnote nine of the Coral Ridge Ministries
Media, Inc. decision, the court noted that Coral Ridge asked the court to
do away with the actual malice requirement. This would upset First
Amendment jurisprudence going all the way back to New York Times v.
Sullivan. In fact, there are many scholarly articles on either side of this
discussion. Those in favor of the actual malice requirement are
concerned about freedom of the press if the requirement is overturned.
Requiring a showing of actual malice for public figures allows the press
to publish stories about public figures without having to fear
defamation suits if the story is inadvertently wrong. On the other hand,
those who want to do away with the actual malice requirement see the
requirement as a “free pass” for bad journalism. Their question is: why
should journalists be protected for publishing false information?
According to those in favor of the requirement, there are plenty of ways
in which journalists are held accountable for false journalism, and the
actual malice requirement does not promote false journalism. Justice
Gorsuch and Justice Thomas have each expressed some desire to
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change the law laid down in New York Times v. Sullivan, so there is a
chance this case may be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States.

